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it to shoemakers, books, writers, civilization, truth, love, manhood, integrity, and spires. He finds fault with novelists for "discarding the social and political systems which are the offspring of Christianity as its choicest framework and material." Does he want novels written simply in support of the Unitarian or Baptist churches? He charges Dickens with not having the Christian element in his writings; but how can the Christian element appear save in the sweetness and purity which the author acknowledges as existing in his characters? Is not that the only way they are seen in life? We will not deny that these lectures may have done, and still may do, much good, but we can recommend their perusal only to those who can be satisfied with the smallest amount of thought, buried under the greatest amount of words.

- 9.—*Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb.* By WILLIAM W. GOODWIN, Ph.D., Eliot Professor of Greek Literature in Harvard University. Second Edition, Revised. Cambridge: Sever and Francis. 1865. 12mo. pp. xv., 264.

THE first edition of this work appeared in 1860. That it was received with favor appears from the fact that a new edition is so soon called for. It supplied, indeed, a want which had been very sensibly felt by advanced students of the Greek language. In former times little attention was paid to the special and exact use of the different parts of the verb. Scholars were satisfied with giving to any particular form the rendering which seemed to be required by the immediate context, without inquiring how far the rendering thus given corresponded to the use of the same form in other cases. But the scientific spirit of the present century has demanded a more thorough treatment for this, as for all other departments of grammar. The various uses of each mood and tense, the various forms used for each modal and temporal relation, even the peculiarities in the usage of different periods, dialects, and authors, have been made the subject of careful investigation. The elementary grammars which have appeared within the last twenty years, though they show the fruits of such studies, could not of course satisfy the wants of advanced scholars. Even the larger and more copious grammars have left much to be desired. Buttmann, while he put a new face on the treatment of Greek inflection, did comparatively little for the syntax. Matthiä furnished an extended and elaborate syntax; but in this part of it he shows a want of comprehensive views which takes much from the value of his rich collection of examples. Kühner is unduly influenced by a scheme of syntactical

philosophy: that his general view of the relations between the subjunctive and optative was unfounded and misleading, is clearly proved by Professor Goodwin in an interesting Appendix to this work. In Krüger's Grammar, which has never appeared in an English dress, and in Madvig's Syntax, the subject is ably treated; and by Madvig particularly in a really admirable manner. But a subject so complex requires a special treatise for its satisfactory exposition and illustration. Such treatises have been produced in Germany, by Bäumlein in 1846, and by Aken in 1861. Without stopping to criticise them, we may express the conviction, that in extent of research and in mastery of the subject Professor Goodwin's work is not inferior to either of them, while in fitness for the purposes of instruction it is very greatly their superior.

The work before us is, indeed, a model of thoroughness. All the multiplied varieties of idiom which stand connected with the use of the verb-forms are here carefully noted, discriminated from each other, and illustrated by examples. The peculiarities of Herodotus, of Pindar, of the Attic poets, and, above all, those of the Homeric language, form the subject of many interesting and valuable observations. Even the various readings of the manuscripts, where a difference of mood is among the most frequent variations, are constantly taken into account. The arrangement of the matter is excellent; and it is so set off by differences of letter-size, by the headings of the pages, and by references from one part to another, that one can hardly ever be at a loss where to find the information which he wants. The style is copious and clear. The general descriptions of idiom are drawn out with a decided fulness of expression, but in terms carefully chosen and conscientiously exact. The student is never left in doubt as to the meaning of the writer. The proof-passages cited from Greek authors are very numerous; and a large proportion of them — larger in the second edition than in the first — are translated. These translations, at once faithful and felicitous, add much to the value of the book. They show how the author understands and applies his own rule, and thus furnish often the clearest, as well as most compact, explanation of its scope and bearings. Great pains are taken to compare together the forms of expression which approach each other in meaning, and to point out the precise differences between them. To one who considers how complex, and, in general, how subtle are the phenomena set forth in this work, it will appear surprising that they should be presented in a manner not only so intelligible, but so vivid and impressive.

Among the peculiar features of his work, our author in his Preface gives a just prominence to his treatment of conditional sentences. He

makes a distinction, which no one has made before with the same clearness and consistency, between *general* and *particular* suppositions. He shows, — (1.) That in suppositions relating to a particular event, while the indicative is the regular form, it is more common, if the event is a future one, to find the subjunctive or optative; and (2.) That in suppositions of a general character, — when “if” has the force of “if ever,” “whenever,” “in whatever case,” — the subjunctive and optative are the moods regularly used, the indicative being found only in occasional exceptions. These principles throw great light on the whole subject of conditional sentences. They are made to furnish an excellent classification for such sentences. And this classification is afterward extended, with much ingenuity and elegance, to the very numerous sentences, beginning with relative pronouns and adverbs, which refer to indefinite antecedents and have a quasi-conditional character.

The book shows plainly that it was composed with practical aims, that it was designed to be used as a text-book for instruction, and, in particular, that it was intended to serve as a guide and help in Greek composition. Hence it is that the author does not content himself with enumerating and explaining the Greek forms of mood and tense: he often takes up the English forms, and shows how they are represented in Greek. And it doubtless proceeds, in part at least, from these practical aims, that he studiously avoids considerations of a theoretical character, and that he discards from his treatment of the moods the somewhat metaphysical categories of “reality,” “possibility,” and the like, which have been generally looked to for modal distinctions. In this direction his second edition goes even farther than the first. As he says in his Preface: —

“In the first edition, I could not persuade myself to abandon the old doctrines so completely as to exclude the common distinction between the subjunctive and optative in protasis, — that the former implies ‘a prospect of decision,’ while the latter does not. Subsequent experience has convinced me that there is no more distinction between ἐὰν τοῦτο ποιῇ and εἰ τοῦτο ποιούῃ than between the English *if he shall do this* and *if he should do this*; and I think every one must see that here there is no distinction but that of greater or less vividness of expression. The simple fact that both could be expressed by the Latin *si hoc faciat* is a strong support of this view.” — p. iv.

The argument drawn from the Latin *si hoc faciat* is weakened by the well-known fact that conceptions which are distinguished in one language are confounded in another: thus the Greek ἐποίησα, “I did,” and πεποίηκα, “I have done,” are both expressed by the Latin *fecit*, while yet no one would doubt that the two Greek forms differ in more than a “greater or less vividness of expression.” As regards

ἐὰν τοῦτο ποιῇ and εἰ τοῦτο ποιήσῃ, it may be that the term "prospect of decision" is not well chosen for bringing out the difference between them; yet we find it not altogether inappropriate in describing the difference, to our own feeling, between *if he shall do this* and *if he should do this*. Both represent an event of which the occurrence is as yet undetermined; but in the former we recognize a *looking forward* toward future determination, which we do not find in the latter, — which, if it may be understood in connection with the latter, is not expressed by it. When we say the former, we assume an attitude of expectation, which we voluntarily relinquish when we pass to the latter. This, in fact, is indicated in the English form of expression. *Should* is the past tense of *shall*: the expectation which is signified as present by *shall*, is by *should* properly signified as past. But in saying *if he should come*, why do we use a form of past expectation? the supposed event belongs to the future, and it is apparent that there is no actual reference to any past time. Evidently, the form of past expectation is a contrivance of language, intended simply to set aside the idea of present expectation, to deny it a place among the elements of thought expressed in the supposition. There is thus, no doubt, a difference of vividness between the forms in question; but that is only the result of a difference in the elements of thought which they express.

Professor Goodwin does not attempt to state in general terms how the three principal moods, indicative, subjunctive, and optative, are distinguished in meaning from each other. He presents in descriptions and examples the special uses of each, but does not seek to show how far these uses are connected by anything common to them all. Indeed, he holds it impossible, as regards any one of the three, to include all its uses under one definition.

"Any definition," he says, "which is to include all the uses of the indicative must be comprehensive enough to include even the imperfect and pluperfect subjunctive in Latin; for εἰ ἔγραψεν, ἦλθον ἄν is equivalent to *scripsisset, venissem*. It would be equally impossible to give a single definition sufficiently precise to be of any use in practice, including all the uses of the subjunctive or optative." — p. 1.

If by this it is meant that no definition can be given in which all the uses of the Greek indicative would be involved as necessary consequences, we can hardly question its correctness. But if it is meant that there is no element of thought which belongs to the indicative in all its uses, and does not belong to the subjunctive or optative, then its truth is not equally obvious. It is very true that the Latin has the subjunctive in some cases where the Greek has the indicative; but it does not follow that in such cases the conceptions expressed by the two

languages are in all respects identical. The Greek often has *ἐποίησα* where in English we should say *I have done*, or *I had done*; yet it is certain that our English forms contain an idea of completed action which is foreign to the Greek aorist. In like manner, it is conceivable that what in one language is viewed as an *assumed* (not an *asserted*) *reality*, should in another be viewed and expressed as a *possibility*. There is nothing, certainly, in the general relations of different languages, to prevent us from admitting this.

We are not now asserting that all the uses of the indicative do in fact have one common element characteristic of the mood. We know that in the Greek genitive are combined two cases, a genitive and an ablative, which were originally distinct; and so, in the Greek dative, three cases, a dative, an instrumental, and a locative of the primitive language. To trace all the uses of the Greek genitive, or the Greek dative, to a single root, would be a futile attempt. And it may be so with the indicative mood. The question, however, is one which grammatical science cannot forbear to raise,—Do all these uses of the indicative spring from one root, and, if so, what is it? or from two or more roots, and, if so, how many and what are they? It may be that the means are as yet wanting which would furnish an answer—a fully satisfactory answer—to such inquiries. In that case we can only state to ourselves the most probable conclusions thus far arrived at, recognizing the uncertainty which may attach to them, and leaving the rest to future research. Care must be used, of course, not to mistake probabilities for certainties, and especially not to warp the facts given in actual usage, in order to make them consistent with our theoretical results. It is notorious that in too many cases such care has not been exercised; that abstract notions of modality have been made to furnish a host of false or unmeaning explanations, to the prejudice of careful observation and sound criticism. It is not surprising that a sober and cautious scholar, disgusted with this misuse, should go to the opposite extreme of rejecting all ideas properly modal, at least as regards the three moods in question. But if this procedure relieves him from some difficulties, a single instance will show that it is not without disadvantages of its own.

We have already noticed Professor Goodwin's treatment of the forms *ἐὰν ποιῇ* and *εἰ ποιῇ*. But there is another form, made by *εἰ* with the future indicative, which, like these, is used in suppositions that relate to a particular event in the future. Thus we have *εἰ ἐλεύσεται*, *if he comes* (i. e. *shall come*,—the Anglo-Saxon present serves also as a future), *ἐὰν ἔλθῃ*, *if he come*, and *εἰ ἔλθοι*, *if he should come*; in all which our author recognizes a difference only in vividness, the first being more vivid than

the second, and the second than the third. But it is hard to believe that the language should have created three such forms of expression with an original and permanent difference in vividness alone; and still more, when we find the same threefold distinction reproduced in our English idiom. We cannot help feeling that such a difference is a fact which requires to be accounted for. If now we could recognize in the first form an element of *reality* (a reality assumed, not asserted) which does not appear in the second, and in the second form an element of *expectation* which does not appear in the third, the progressive differences in vividness would be simply and naturally accounted for. Explanations like these, even if founded on views which are more or less doubtful, may yet have the value often allowed to hypothesis in science, that of connecting together, and bringing into intelligible order, what would otherwise appear as isolated facts. In a similar way, one might account for the facts, already stated, to which our author gives prominence in his treatment of conditional sentences. Thus in particular suppositions, when the condition is a future event, it is natural that it should be conceived as a *possibility*, as something *liable to occur*, rather than as *actually occurring* in the future. And in general suppositions, it is equally natural that the indefinite condition should be conceived as something liable to occur, something that *may* or *might occur* on any occasion, rather than as an actual occurrence. By such considerations we should not, of course, expect to show that the Greek must of necessity use the forms he did. But if we can only show that it was natural for him to use them, we may at least take from the rules that we lay down that disconnected and arbitrary character which would otherwise belong to them.

But we are dwelling too long on matters which, if not without scientific interest, do not seriously affect the practical value of the work before us,—a work which we confidently regard as the best yet produced on the subject of which it treats.

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10. — *Sesame and Lilies*. *Two Lectures delivered at Manchester in 1864*. By JOHN RUSKIN, M.A. 1. *Of Kings' Treasuries*; 2. *Of Queens' Gardens*. Second Edition, with Preface. London: Smith, Elder, & Co. 1865. pp. xxiii., 196.

DURING the eight years that have elapsed since the publication of "The Political Economy of Art," Mr. Ruskin's thought, which by nature and habit directs itself to analysis and the solution of problems, has mainly spent itself on the consideration of questions of public economy